The Structural View of
Scientific Theories and the Theory of Operant Behavior[1]
Christoph Kraiker
Summary:
Using a basic theory of operant behavior as an example, the so-called
„structural view“ of scientific theories is described and contrasted with the
traditional (statement-) view. Within the structural view several difficulties
of behavior theory are more easily dissolved, such as the question of its
subject-matter, the relationship between theory and practice, the „dynamics“
of theories, the compatibility of
different theories (eclecticism) and the problem of behavioral determinism.
Zusammenfassung: Am Beispiel einer elementaren
Theorie des Operanten Verhaltens wird die sog. „strukturalistische Auffassung“
wissenschaftlicher Theorien entwickelt und der traditionellen (Aussagen-)
Konzeption gegenübergestellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass sich innerhalb dieser
Auffassungen einige Schwierigkeiten von Verhaltenstheorien besser erklären und
bewältigen lassen, u.a. das Problem ihres Gegenstandes, das Verhältnis von
Theorie und Praxis, die „Dynamik“ von Theorien, das Wesen von Erklärungen in
den Verhaltenswissenschaften, die Nicht-Falsifizierbarkeit von Theorien, die
Vereinbarkeit unterschiedlicher Theorien (Eklektizismus) und das Problem des
Verhaltensdeterminismus.
Sommaire:
Au moyen de l`example d`une théorie simplifiée du comportmnent operant,
l`auteur développe une conception „structurale“ des théories scientifiques et
l`oppose au concept traditionnel (de théorèmes). Cette vue permet à l`auteur de
mieux résoudre certaines difficultés posées par les théories comportementales
telles que: le problème de leur sujet,
le rapport entre la théorie et la pratique, le „dynamisme“ des théories, la
nature des explications dans les sciences comportementales, l`impossibilité de
falsifier les théories, la compatibilité des differentes théories
(éclecticisme) et le problème du déterminisme de comportement.
The clinical application of behavior theory[2], the movement (or
flight) from the laboratory to semi-chaotic consulting rooms, homes and
institutions, has resulted in the appearance or reappearance of some
theoretical puzzles which are well worth considering or reconsidering. Those
puzzles are all connected with the problem of the nature of scientific theories
in general (and that of behavior theory in particular) and can be traced to an
inadequate understanding of such theories. As a starting point it will be
useful to outline some important features of the classical, orthodox or
„received“ view of scientific theories.
We can assume that at least one of the goals of science is to explain (and/or predict) the phenomena
under consideration. For the time being, we shall also assume (although this is
a much debated issue) that conformity to the so-called „covering-law-model“ of
scientific explanation (Hempel, 1966) is a necessary condition for any proposed
explanation to be acceptable. Roughly speaking, this means that the following
conditions have to be met.
I. We need an explanandum, a
description of the state of affairs we wish to have explained (e.g., „A is
afraid of rats“);
II: We need an explanans,
consisting of
a) at least one general law or universal statement (e.g., „Whosoever has
undergone a conditioning procedure of type M will be afraid of rats“), and
b) at least one singular statement (e.g. „A has indeed undergone a
conditioning procedure of type M“), such that
III. the explanandum can be logically deduced from the general law(s) in
conjunction with the singular statement(s).
Hence it follows that a theory worth its salt (i.e. able to explain
things) must contain at least one (and usually more than one) law of the general
form: „For all x: if x has the quality F, then it has the quality G“. Laws are
statements or sentences (this is true of deterministic as well as statistical
laws), therefore - and this is the orthodox view - scientific theories are sets
or systems of statements (sentences)
with certain logical relationships among one another. Theories are looked upon
as devices into which factual statements are fed with the result that
explanations and predictions are ejected (logically deduced).[3]
If, however, we investigate the actual procedure of science we often
find something quite different. An instructive example is Teasdale`s attempt
(1974) to derive hypotheses about the nature of obsessional-compulsive
disorders from experimental studies of animal and human learning. The models he
eventually presents are definitely not logically deduced from a given set of
general and singular statements. Something ingenious has been done, but it
cannot be accounted for by the traditional concept of scientific theories.
Furthermore, this view invariably leads to those puzzles already mentioned. I
shall list only a few.
1. The theory-practice puzzle.
What exactly is the relationship between theory and practice? Can we derive
everything we actually do from the theory (which intuively appears to be
nonsense) and if not, does this not invalidate the theory (cf. Locke´s critique
of Wolpe, 1971)? Is behavior theory an ideology relative to behavior
modification (London 1972)?
2. The falsification puzzle.
If one of our explanations turns out to be wrong, if a prediction goes astray,
if a therapy results in failure, then we should throw away the theory - but we
don´t. So, it seems, we are either inconsistent or have to blame the sloppiness
of our work.
3. The research puzzle. Why do
we need experimentation if our theory tells us what is going to happen in a
given case? If it does not do this, why do we keep it? Surely, not every
experiment is an experimentum crucis
the outcome of which determines whether we shall remain what we are or whether
we shall become, say, psychoanalysts.
4. The subject-matter puzzle.
If behavior theory deals with behavior, how is it to be distinguished from
other disciplines which also deal with behavior such as physiology, ethology,
sociology, and physics? If it explains behavior, how can other disciplines
explain it as well?
5. The compatibility-incompatibility
puzzle. Can we work with different theories (models or paradigms) within a
given field without becoming once more logically inconsistent? On a pragmatic
level we may also call this the orthodoxy-eclecticism
puzzle. Are, for instance, dynamic psychotherapy and behavior therapy really
irreconciliable (Marmor, 1971), not to mention countless other psychological
approaches?
6. The determinism puzzle. Is the assumption of determinism a necessary
requirement for scientific behavior theories (Skinner, 1953) since otherwise we
could not find the necessary laws? If so, how are planning, intervention,
self-control etc. possible?
If those and other puzzles arise from our inclination to view theories
as sets of general statements we might be able to dissolve them by introducing
another concept of scientific theories, one which Stegmüller (1975) calls the
„structural view“. The basics of this exposition and much of its terminology
are derived from the work of Sneed (1971), who first developed this concept in
the context of mathematical physics, and from Stegmüller (1973, 1974, 1975),
who generalized and clarified Sneed´s results. Applying it to (as yet
non-mathematical) behavior theory makes it necessary to change and simplify
many of their ideas. For any violation of their letter and/or spirit I bear the
sole responsibility.
In order to make this discussion relevant to our problems, I shall
reconstruct, as an example, a simplified version of what might be called a
basic theory of operant behavior. The reconstruction is not meant to be
complete and I am aware that there is more than that to behavior theories; it
is merely used to make clear some decisive logical characteristics of such
theories in general.
Now, the following lines are
going to look truly awful, but I will
illustrate them with an example, and then the abstract stuff will become much
clearer.
We begin by defining an operant
behavior system (OBS) through the introduction of a set-theoretic
predicate:
DF-OBS (Definition of an Operant Behavior System)
x is an OBS if and only there exists an organism O, a class B of
responses or behaviors of that organism, a class of stimuli S, a class of
events K, and their relations c, f, and j such that
1. x consists of the organism
O,
2. x consists of elements of
the class of stimuli S,
3. x consists of elements of
the class of behaviors B,
4. x consists of elements of
the class of events K,
5. If an element of S occurs,
then (sometimes or always) one or more elements of B
occur, either in the presence
of S or shortly afterwards (relation SBc).
6. After each occurance of an
element of B, or after a varying number of such occurances,
one or several elements of K
occur (relation BKf).
7. The occurance of elements
of K influences the probabilty that elements of B occur in
the wake of elements of S (SBKj).
This definition of an OBS may be regarded as an informal axiomatization of the fundamental internal structure of
the system, 1. to 7. being the defining axioms. Like any other definition of a
system it essentially consists of statements about the constituents of that
system and the relationships that obtain between them.
Here comes the example:
There is Charlie, a white rat in cage number five. From time to time a
small green light bulb in the cage is lit for about five seconds. As soon as
this occurs, Charlie runs to a lever protruding from the wall and presses it a
few times. After a varying number of lever presses a food pellet is dropped
noisily into a tray. Every time that happens, Charlie runs to the tray and eats
the pellet.
Here, the class S (Stimuli) is defined as the green bulb lightening up
for five seconds, the class B (Behaviors) is defined as pressing the lever, the
class K (consequences) is defined as the dropping of pellets into the tray.
Thus, here SBc means that lever presses occur after the little green bulb
lights up, and BKf means that after (one or several) lever presses a food pellet
is dropped into the tray, and SBKj means that the
dropping of the pellets reinforces the pressing of the lever (meaning all kinds
of things), with the green light as the discriminative Stimulus. Note that the
eating of the pellets is not part of the OBS as just described - it is, so to
speak, abstracted out.
The history of operant behavior theory begins with the actual production
of operant behavior systems (OBSs), for instance the classical experimental
set-ups in operant conditioning with rats and pidgeons. This allows us to do
two things.
a) We are now in the position to advance the very fundamental claim
„there are indeed OBSs“, pointing at those realizations which we shall call paradigmatic examples of OBSs:
b) we are able to give an approximate explication of what „j“ means, showing
for instance how in the presence of elements of S the probability for an
occurence of elements of B is increased if in this situation the Bs are
followed by Ks, how that probability decreases if we discontinue the
presentation of Ks, and so on. Clearly, this expectation of „j“ by giving
examples is not exhaustive but leaves much room for further elaboration.
Whereas we thus get some idea about the meaning of „j“, this predicate
still differs in an essential way from „c“ and „f“. The latter two are
„uncomplicated“ inasmuch as they denote simple temporal and statistical
relationships that usually can be determined by mere inspection of an ongoing
behavior system. Whether „j“ obtains between the constituents
of a behavior system cannot be so determined: in order to do this we must
either have extended knowledge about the history or genesis of that system or
we must perform some experiments, such as removing and reintroducing the Ks to
see what happens. We also must exclude alternative explanations for the effects
that may appear. Without giving a detailed justification, I shall just state
that „j“ therefore is a complex dispositional predicate and must be regarded as
a theoretical expression not explicitly definable in terms of operations or
observations. All we can do is provide partial characterizations.
Now, the seventh axiom of DF-OBS, demanding that the constituents of a
system are j- related, is obviously the essential one, since only if it is true of a
given system, that system is a real OBS. We shall therefore call a system which
fulfills all seven axioms of DF-OBS a complete
model or realization of an OBS.
A system which fulfills the axioms 1. to 6. - i.e. a system in which
axiom 7. may or may not also hold - we shall call a possible model or realization of an OBS, because this is the kind
of a behavior system of which it is reasonable
to ask whether it is an OBS or not.
Only possible models of OBSs can be complete models of OBSs, that is to say,
the class of complete models is a subset
of the class of possible models.
Any system which fulfills some of the axioms 1. to 6., but not all of
them, for instance a class of behaviors of an organism occuring repeatedly
during a given period of time, we shall call a partial possible model of an OBS. They represent, as it were, fragments of possible models.
We have now at our disposal three set-theoretic predicates defining
different types of behavior systems related in certain ways to each other. Examining the terms occuring
in the defining axioms we find they all designate determinable qualities; each
one marks out a possible range of affairs but is not specific about it. Thus,
„X is an O“ may be made more precise by saying „X is a white rat“ and even more
so by saying „X is Charlie, the white rat sitting in cage No. 5“. However, „X
is a stone“ is not a specification of „X is an O“ since the extension of „X is
an O“ does not cover objects of that sort. Similarily, „X is a S“ and „X is a
K“ can be determined qualitatively (by stating what kinds of events they are,
e.g. presentations of lights, sounds, food pellets, removal of E-shocks etc.)
as well as, at least to a certain extent, quantitatively (stating e.g. pitch
and loudness of sounds, strenghts of E-shocks and so on): Clearly, in any
realization of one of the defined systems the relation predicates c, f, and j can also be
quantitatively determined. A description of a system in terms more determinate
than those used in the defining predicate will be called a specification of that predicate. Thus, „ a is a system consisting
of John washing his hands fifty times a day“ is a specification of „a is a
system consisting of an organism and a non-empty class of behaviors emitted by
this organism“. Most important in this context are specifications with respect
to the predicate „j“, since „j“ represents the
lawful functional relations between the constituents of an OBS. Such a
specification would for instance include statements indicating the effects of
various schedules of reinforcement within an otherwise specified OBS or class
of OBSs.
We shall now examine and discuss
in several steps how all this makes it possible to reconstruct rationally the
scientific enterprise, especially the business of working with the theory of
operant behavior.
1. As already mentioned, on a very fundamental level and using the most
basic predicate we can say „There are complete models of operant behavior
systems“ or, formally „There are some X such that X is an element of the class
of OBSs.“ We justify this claim by pointing to the paradigmatic examples, those OBSs we have already realized in our
laboratories. The class of paradigmatic examples ought not to be considered a
closed set. Any specific types of possible
models of an OBS may be included in it, provided that it has reliably been
shown by repeated experimentation that it is indeed a complete OBS. This last
requirement makes it clear that the class of paradigmatic examples is in fact a
class of classes. Individual systems
will not be included in it but only types
of systems, such as lever pushing responses of rats followed by representation
of food pellets in the presence of visible light, and so on.
2. The listing of complete models of OBSs requires at least qualitative
specifications, indicating the kind of constituents the model consist of (what
organism, behavior, stimuli etc.). Next, we try to give quantitative
specifications of the variables involved, attributing more or less definite values
to the probability or frequency of response, the temporal relationships, the
magnitude of stimuli and so forth. Usually, as a first step we define various
specific versions of possible models
of operant behavior systems. Unfortunately, the concepts used for that purpose
(such as positive reinforcement, punishment, free operant or discriminated
avoidance) confound procedures and effects and so provide a source of endless
quibbles (cf. the hoary debate on the circularity of the law of effect). It is of
paramount importance to define procedures (types of possible models) first and
determine the effects independently.
3. This is exactly one kind of systematic research whithin the theory of
operant behavior. It consists of a) manipulating the values of a specific
system or class of systems under investigation and b) finding out what the
effects of those manipulations upon other variables are. All studies concerned
with the result of different schedules of reinforcement, delay of
reinforcement, discriminative learning etc. are of this nature. Restricting our
attention to classes of systems the outcome will be twofold:
I. For any specific type of System S we should be able to formulate a
set of S-specific laws stating the
particular functional relationships holding between the variables of S.
II. Once we have been able to do this with several classes of systems we
can put forward a set of application laws
stating simply which special or particular laws hold in which classes of
behavior systems. If we are able to say what kind of organism will be
sucessfully reinforced with what kind of stimulus for some kind of behavior, we
have a simple law for this type.
4. There are obviously various and diverse types of OBSs, in other
words, the theory is „meant“ not just for one but for several applications (the
terms applications and models being used synonymously). Now, the predictive and
explanatory power of a theory depends heavily on so-called constraints which „will require that certain relations hold among
the values of theoretical functions employed in different applications of the
theory“ (Sneed, 1971, p. 66). Using Sneed`s example of classical (Newtonian)
particle mechanics, only if we assume that the mass of a given body is a
intrinsic property of that body and remains the same whether it orbits around
the earth, the moon, the sun, or is used as a pendulum, can we make predictions
across different applications of the
theory. Otherwise, determining the mass of a body by means of an analytical
balance would tell us nothing about the behavior of that body in other
circumstances.
Similarily, if we could operationally determine something like
„reinforcing power“ of a class of stimuli, for instance by noting the number of
contingent presentations needed to raise the probability of a response from p
to p´, and if this „reinforcing power“ remained the same across all
applications, for all behaviors of all organisms, then we would have a very
powerful tool for predictions and explanations. Unfortunately, this does not
seem to be the case, and here we have one of the reasons why the theory of
operant behavior is relatively weak compared with Newtonian mechanics.
5. Nevertheless, research in operant behavior must be able to propound
at least some limited constraints in order to be useful at all. On a very
fundamental level we might be able to establish that in a given individual
application of the theory a certain stimulus remains reinforcing over time or
varies in this property according to known laws, e.g. of satiation and fatigue.
Then, hopefully, it can be shown that a stimulus is reinforcing for a
well-defined class of behaviors of a definite class of organisms under standard
conditions - otherwise S-specific laws and application laws would not be
possible. Perhaps we can also demonstrate that a stimulus has controlling
properties across several organisms, behaviors and specific procedures. These
are just examples, but it should be clear that the search for more and more
extensive constraints is one of the central aims of research within a
theoretical framework.
6. A theory derives its dynamics from the belief (or conviction or hope)
that beyond the class of paradigmatic examples further applications will be
found. The attempt to find such applications is the third aspect of research
„guided“ by a theory. As it is also one of the most fascinating aspects it will
be necessary to give a detailed picture of those operations within the
structural view of operant behavior theory.
We start with the suspicion that certain as yet vaguely understood
phenomena, such as some kinds of pathological behaviors, might turn out to be
constituents of operant behavior systems as defined by the set-theoretic
predicate „X is an OBS“.
In order to prove this we must show that they are constituents of
possible models of OBSs and this requires beforehand that the phenomena are
partial possible models. So, the pathological
behaviors under investigation must be describable as (must consist of) a
class of behaviors so defined that - as a minimal requirement - their repeated
occurance over periods of time can be reliably determined by one or more
observers. At this point we see how working with a theory demands submission of
certain description-guiding rules. We
could of course describe the behavior of a well-conditioned rat in a Skinner
box as „working for food“, „gorging on pellets“, „twitching some muscles“, but
that would not lead us anywhere. There are numerous ways of describing a
complex phenomenon extending over time but only some of those are relevant with
respect to a given theory. It now becomes clear what the slogan „description in the light of a theory“
really means. It does not imply that the eyes of the theoretician are endowed
with particular powers of sight strangely denied to others. Since description
always and of necessity involves abstraction, what it does mean is that the theoretician abstracts from a
phenomenon those features that can be described as partial possible models of
the structural core (cf. section 8.) of this theory. Out of such partial
possible models he hopes to construct the possible models.
Further , the structural core of a theory not only provides
description-guiding rules but also search-guiding
rules. Once we have described a neurosis as a set (or sets) of behavior(s)
occuring every so often, we must look for kinds of events which are requisites
for possible models of an OBS. That is, we must look for a set of events that
stand in certain antecedent temporal relationships to the behaviors (for only
these are elegibile as „discriminant stimuli“) and we must look for another set
of events that follow those behaviors in a certain way for only they can be
reinforcers. Only when we have found those sets of events and specified their
temporal relationships do we have the description af a possible model of an
OBS.[4] Then we have to
ask the decisive question: is this possible model a complete model, a
realization of an operant behavior system? Are the events consequent to the
behaviors really reinforcers of that behavior? Are the antecedent events really
discriminative stimuli? Is it true that „SBKj“?
At this juncture, the structural core of the theory together with the
already existing class of paradigmatic examples provide us with operation-guiding rules. The class of
paradigmatic examples is characterized by sets of specific laws which represent
a partial interpretation of „j“. They thus delineate a range
of interventions which may be applied to certain variables of a possible model
under investigation and mark out the kind of effects upon other certain
variables which are necessary for the system to qualify as a complete model of
an OBS. We may, for instance, prevent the occurance of what are possible
reinforcing stimuli and note the effect upon the frerquency of behavior. The operation-guiding rules not only tell us
how to determine whether a possible model of an OBS is indeed a complete model
(something which in given case may be quite difficult and require sophisticated
research techniques), they also tell us how to modify some variables of the
system by modifying others.
7. We may not only try to reconstruct
partial models as possible models and finally as complete models of an OBS,
we may also try to actively construct
complete models by supplementing partial possible models (behaviors we find)
with those elements that would make them possible models and thereby - if we
have been lucky or inspired - complete models. Whenever we attempt to raise the
probability or frequency of a response by introducing suitable reinforcers, we
do just this. First we choose a certain setting as potential discriminative
stimulus, then we select other stimuli which are presented contingent upon the
behavior we wish to change. We produce a possible model and if this has been
done correctly, it turns out to be a complete model, that is, the behavior
changes as intended. Of course, this will not necessarily be the outcome. The
choice of potential reinforcers and discriminative stimuli is by and large a
matter of trial and error since the constraints available whithin the theory of
operant behavior are very limited. But we do have definite knowledge about the
temporal relationships called for and we do have some ideas about what might be
an effective reinforcer. The search-guiding and operation-guiding rules
provided by the theory certainly restrict the range of promising activities.
8. Having come so far, we are now in a position to elucidate the concept
of theory. We distinguish between
I. the structural core of the theory, consisting of 1) a number of
set-theoretics predicates defining axiomatically the logical (or mathematical)
structure of systems, and 2) the description-guiding,
search-guiding and operation-guiding rules;
II. the periphery of the
theory, consisting of special laws, application laws and constraints, that is,
empirical statements which are generated by applying the rules of I. to certain
phenomena.
It is important to see that the periphery of the theory (the empirical
laws) is not logically deduced from
its core. It is created by
scientists. The laws of periphery enter into explanations and predictions, they
are subjects to confirmation and falsification, but this process does not touch
the theory proper, i.e. the structural core. The core is immune to
falsification, not because it consists of statements mysteriously invulnerable
to contrary empirical evidence, but because it does not consist of factual
statements at all. It is just not the kind of thing to which the predicate
„falsifiable“ could be meaningfully applied.
9. We can understand this more clearly when we ask what happens if an
attempt to reconstruct a class of behaviors as constituents of a complete OBS
is not successful. Suppose researcher A wishes to influence the occurence of
epileptic convulsions (grand mal) by the subsequent presentation of stimuli
which he believes to be punishing. However, no matter what he tries, no results
are forthcoming. What does this prove with respect to the underlying theory? Is
it thereby falsified? Must we reject it utterly? Obviously, as Stegmüller
(1974) put it, the frustrated attempt to find a new application (model) of a
given theory first of all throws „discredit“ upon the person who has tried to
do so. The researcher has failed, and this is all we can say so far. Only if
generations of workers are unseccessful in reconstructing a class of behaviors
as an application of the theory, this class of behaviors will be eliminated
from the class of intended applications
of the theory. Thus, by a process which Stegmüller calls the autodetermination of the range of
applications of the theory, that theory will become more specified in the
course of its development with respect to the phenomena it can be applied to.
Only the (revisable) laws of the periphery can be falsified, the theory as
such, i.e. is structural core, cannot. The worst that could happen is that we
find no or only a few applications of it. If so, sooner or later there will
probably be no one or just very few people working with it. But this does not
necessarily have to be the case: there is no conclusive reason to give up hope.
10. We can now characterize more precisely the subject-matter of operant
behavior theory. It does not deal
with behavior as such - otherwise one could hardly distinguish it from other
disciplines such as physiology or ethology. Rather, it deals with behavior
systems, that is behavior only insofar as it stands in certain defined
relations to other events.
This tells us something about the nature of explanation. Traditionally
the relationship between explanans
and explanandum has been likened to
fatherhood. We have an event, pure and simple, and try to find the true and correct explanation for it,
just as we have a child and look for his father - and of course he can have
only one. In fact, however, explaining events always means showing how they are
dependent on some other variables of a given system, and since events usually
are constituents of many different systems, various true and correct
explanations can be given. Most or all behaviors can be explained in terms of
muscle and sceleton mechanics and/ or physiology and/ or endocrinology; that
is, as elements of systems that are not
operant behavior systems. „Explain the event!“ is a meaningless injunction.
Events can only be explained as dependent on a given set of variables - if they
are so dependent. Which kind of explanation one looks for depends entirely on
the practical interests one pursues. We know quite well that compulsive hand
washing presupposes activities of motoric nerves, but we are not inclined to
eliminate this symptom by means of simple surgery. It could be done, but the
side effects would be annoying.
11. This analysis, if it is basically correct, leads to important
consequences concerning the compatibility of different theories. It has become
clear that theories do not advance universal claims about the world; they are
applicable to the world, but then only within a limited range. The belief that
there are OBSs as defined is of course not imcompatible with the belief that
there are other behavior systems, for instance, unconsciously motivated
behaviors. The possibility of conflicts arises only if divergent claims are
advanced with respect to a definite behavior or class of behaviors, but even in
this case the issue is not as unequivocal as it may appear.
Let us give an example. Analysis reveals that the deficient study
behavior of a student is due to negative self-evaluation after each attempted
performance. The therapist trains his patient in replacing negative
self-evaluations by positive ones, pointing out the abilities he actually
possesses. He modifies „what the patient says to himself“ (Meichenbaum, 1971)
and is succesful. Obviously we were dealing with an operant behavior system.
A psychoanalyst, however, might say this patient´s difficulties were the
expression of omnipotence phantasies derived from an unconscious conflict with
his father. Now, whether this is true or not, it certainly does not contradict
the first statement. The behavior therapist was looking at the negative
self-evaluations only insofar as they stood in a certain relationship to the
target behavior and he was fortunate enough to be able to influence that
variable by therapeutic intervention. But it is certainly legitimate to ask how
those evaluations came into existence; quite possibly they were the result of
the patient`s unconscious wish to surpass his father in all respects, so that
actual performance never lived up to the desired level of archievement. Even if
much of what psychoanalysts have said turns out to be gibberish, as a research programme (Lakatos, 1970)
psychoanalysis is not incompatible with operant behavior theory.
Generally, when a theoretican looks at systems with certain constituents
and defined relations between them there is really nothing that could prevent
him from viewing some constituents as elements of other systems. The most
obvious case is Mowrer`s two-factor model of phobias (1951) in which operant
and Pavlovian behavior systems are conjoined. Furthermore, the occurance and
availability of reinforcing events, for instance, depends on many outside
factors (relative to the OBS) such as social and economic status, skills etc.,
so this has to be taken into account as well. Even if we do not look beyond the
OBS under investigation, whether the interesting relationships among its
constituents actually exist depends on „internal“ and perhaps changing
properties of the organism such as deprivation, physiological make-up, genetic
endowment, value and belief systems, motivation, past experiences, drugs and so
on and so on. One can work with the theory of operant behavior, or for the
matter with any other theory, only if one knows a lot besides. If eclecticism means working with different
models or approaches, if it means looking at the world as a network of systems
differing from each other in essential aspects, then it is not only possible,
it is necessary, and has been going on all the time. To let one´s mind stray
too much from the staight and narrow path holds many pitfalls, and like any
other enterprise, it requires ingenuity and luck. A methodological via regia leading invariably to succes
if marched upon with determination does not exist.
12. Finally we shall discuss the issue of determinism which has often been
considered a necessary requirement of any behavioral science worth its name
(cf. Skinner, 1953). This has led to much criticism and vague feelings of
unease. Those who insist upon the freedom of man are confronted with the
problem of how freedom can co-exist with well-established laws of behavior,
others find it difficult to reconcile the idea of determinism with therapeutic
activities such as planning or self-control (Hartig, 1974). The solution I hope
to offer proceeds in several steps.
We shall call an S-act any act of a human being that changes the value
of a given variable in an existing singular operant behavior system S. That
there must be such S-acts is obvious; otherwise we could do no research, no
experiments, no behavior modification.
We shall call basic S-act any
S-act which changes a variable of the system S directly, that is without first changing another variable of S.
A secondary S-act is any S-act
which changes the value of a given variable of S by first changing another
variable. This of course requires the existence of functional relationships
between the variables of that system.
We also distinguish between S-dependent
behaviors, i.e. all behaviors that belong to the class B of behaviors in S
as defined, and S-independent behaviors.
The latter include all behaviors of organisms which are not in S and also
several behaviors of the organism actually belonging to S.
Now, given a class of behaviors B of an organism O that are constituents
of a known operant behavior system S, the practical problem is whether anyone
has at his disproval an S-independent behavior which is a basic S-act, i.e.
which changes at least one variable of S directly. Usually this is done by
therapists or investigators who e.g., exercise stimulus control or interfere with
reinforcement contingenties in order to change the S-dependent behavior B or O.
But it is quite possible that O himself has S-independent behaviors at his
disproval which are basic S-acts and can be used to change some variables of S
directly, with the result that the S-dependent behavior is modified[5] . The thesis of behavioral determinism can then be
stated as follows:
For every behavior C which is independent relative to a behavior system
S there exists ar least one other deterministic behavior system S`such that C
is dependent relative to S`(that is, a constituent of S`).
This assumption may or may not
be true; in any case it can neither be verified nor falsified. Furthermore, it
is neither a consequence nor a presupposition of either the structural core of
the theory or the laws of its periphery. Therefor, working with the theory of
opeant behavior does not require the assumption of behavioral determinism nor
does it require the contrary
assumption. The issue of determinism is really a metaphysical problem.
Concluding remarks
In this paper I have tried to present a view of scientific theories in general and the theory of operant behavior
in particular which seems to do more justice to the actual workings of science
than the traditional view. Is aims are mainly therapeutic: to solve some
puzzles and to show how the acceptance of a theory does not limit the range of
activities and beliefs as strongly as is usually maintained. If it encourages
communication between proponents of different psychological schools and if it
eases the perhaps slightly guilty consciences of those who have never submitted
to the relentless rule of the Philosophy of Science, so much the better.
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[1] Revised version (2003) of „Behavioural Analysis
and the Structural View of Scientific Theories“ (1977). European Journal of
Behavioural Analysis and Modification, 1 (4), 203-213. This revision mainly
attempted to make the exposition more “user friendly”. No substantial changes
appeared necessary, even though in the meantime several books and papers on the
“structural view” were published, notably by Hans Westmeyer and Rainer
Westermann.
[2] „behavior theory“ in this paper to be used as
short for „theory of operant behavior“
[3] These ideas are very lucidly presented in Popper
(1959), p. 59f.
[4] All systems for the analysis of the actual
behavior such as the „behavioral equation“ of Kanfer and Phillips (1970) or the
scheme of Schulte (1976) may be looked upon as devices of generating possible
models of the underlying theory.
[5] The concept of „basic“ acts or actions is more
fully discussed in Danto (1968) and von Wright (1991); the contexts, however,
are somewhat different.